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Renown Health, Inc. v. Vanderford,
126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 24 (July 1, 2010) 1
TORT LAW – NONDELEGABLE DUTY
Summary
Appeal from a district court’s interlocutory order granting partial summary judgment to
Vanderford based on the imposition of a nondelegable duty on Renown Health, Inc. The
question on appeal was whether a hospital owes an absolute nondelegable duty to provide
competent medical care to emergency room patients through independent contractor doctors.
Disposition/ Outcome
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that hospitals do not owe
an absolute nondelegable duty to provide competent care through independent contractor doctors,
however the Court also held that hospitals may be liable for patient injuries under the ostensible
agency doctrine.
Factual and Procedural History
The respondent, Betty Vanderford’s (“Vanderford”), minor son, Christopher Wall
(“Christopher”), fell ill and Vanderford took him to Renown Health, Inc.’s (“Renown”)
emergency room on four separate occasions. Tests were performed during the first visit and
Christopher was released and referred to a specialist. On Christopher’s second visit the hospital
gave him a prescription and released him again. On the third visit Christopher was given another
prescription and released. On the fourth visit Vanderford discovered Christopher unconscious in
Renown’s bathroom and he was diagnosed with basilar meningitis and other complications.
Christopher suffered permanent injuries, including brain damage, as a result of his illness.
Vanderford then sued Renown and the district court granted partial summary judgment
for Vanderford. The district court found that Renown owed Christopher an absolute,
nondelegable duty, and thus it was liable for the acts of the emergency room doctors, who were
independent contractors. The district court supported its decision in four ways. The district court
relied on Nevada statutes, the Joint Committee on the Accreditation of Health Organizations
(“JCAHO”) standards, public policy, common law principles from the Second Restatement of
Torts, and cases from Alaska and South Carolina. 2 Vanderford reached a settlement agreement
with Renown on all issues except for the nondelegable duty issue, on which Renown reserved its
right to appeal.
Discussion
1

By Kristopher Milicevic.
The district court also distinguished this case from Oehler v. Humana, Inc., 105 Nev. 348, 775 P.2d 1271 (1989)
and Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hospital of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 42, 910 P.2d 271 (1996) because neither case involved
an emergency room patient and an independent contractor doctor.
2

The Nevada Supreme Court reviews a district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment and its conclusions regarding questions of law de novo. 3 The Court limited its holding
to the issue of whether hospitals owe a nondelegable to duty patients and whether the ostensible
agency doctrine applies to emergency room scenarios like the one in this case.
Nondelegable Duty
The Court held that there is no basis for imposing an absolute nondelegable duty on
hospitals to provide competent medical care to emergency room patients through independent
contractor doctors under Nevada law. The Court relied on the general rule that hospitals are not
vicariously liable for the acts of independent contractor doctors. 4 While there are some
exceptions to this general rule the Court determined that there was no basis for imposing an
absolute nondelegable duty on Renown.
The Court determined that the district court erred in relying on Nevada’s statutory
scheme, the JCAHO standards, public policy, and the common law to impose an absolute
nondelegable duty on Renown. Nevada’s statutes create a scheme where a hospital is a policysetter and overseer, indeed the provisions contemplate the hospital delegating medical care to
qualified professionals. 5 Likewise, the JCAHO standards emphasize the hospital’s role as a
policy-setter and administrator. The Court used its discretion in refusing to decide an issue if it
involves a policy question better left to the Legislature. 6 Finally, the Court concluded that the
common law relied upon by the district court did not support the imposition of an absolute
nondelegable duty on Renown. While the Alaska case cited to by the district court did impose a
nondelegable duty on hospitals, Alaska’s legislature subsequently passed a law that allows
hospitals to rebut the nondelegable duty. 7 Similarly, the case that the district court relied on from
South Carolina imposed a nonabsolute nondelegable duty, adopted by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which is also referred to as ostensible agency. 8 The Court concluded that a nonabsolute
nondelegable duty is closer to the ostensible agency approach. Therefore the district court erred
in imposing an absolute nondelegable duty on Renown.
The Ostensible Agency Doctrine
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Wood v. Safeway. Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).
Oehler, 105 Nev. at 351, 775 P.2d at 1273 (1989).
5
NEV. REV. STAT. § 439B.410 (2007).
6
Nev. Highway Patrol v. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 107 Nev. 547, 550-51, 815 P.2d 608, 610-11 (1991).
7
Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987); AK. STAT. § 09.65.096 (2008).
8
Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Center, 533 S.E.2d 312, 322 (S.C. 2000).
4

The Court held that Renown could be held liable under the ostensible agency doctrine
that the Court adopted in Scholtfeldt. 9 Under the doctrine, it is a question of fact for a jury to
determine “(1) whether the patient entrusted herself to the hospital, (2) whether the hospital
selected the doctor, (3) whether the patient reasonably believed the doctor was an agent of the
hospital, and (4) whether the patient had notice of the doctor’s independent contractor status.” 10
The Court concluded that public policy favors extending the ostensible agency doctrine to
emergency room situations because it allows victims to recover by meeting the four factors set
out in Scholtfeldt without creating an absolute duty on hospitals.
Conclusion
The Court held that hospitals do not have an absolute nondelegable duty to provide
competent medical care to emergency room patients through independent contractor doctors.
Furthermore, the Court extended the ostensible agency doctrine to emergency room scenarios.
Dissent
The dissent agreed that Nevada law does not currently support the imposition of an
absolute nondelegable duty on hospitals in emergency room scenarios and that the ostensible
agency doctrine naturally extends to the emergency room. However, the dissent argued that
given public policy considerations the nonabsolute nondelegable duty approach should apply to
emergency rooms. The dissent reasoned that patients chose care based upon the advertising and
reputation of the hospital as an agency, and thus hospitals should not be able to escape liability
for the malpractice of independent contractor doctors when the hospital holds themselves out to
the public in such a way.
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Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hospital of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 42, 48, 910 P.2d 271, 275 (1996).
Id. at 275.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

No. 51755

RENOWN HEALTH, INC., F/K/A WASHOE MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
Appellant,
vs.
BETTY VANDERFORD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
CHRISTOPHER WALL, A MINOR,
Respondent.

Appeal from a district court order dismissing a medical malpractice action. Second Judicial
District Court, Washoe County; Janet J. Berry, Judge.
Reversed.
CHERRY, J., with whom SAITTA and GIBBONS, JJ., agreed, dissented.

Piscevich & Fenner and Margo Piscevich, Reno; Molof & Vohl and Robert C. Vohl, Reno, for
Appellant.
John P. Echeverria, Reno; Durney & Brennan and Peter D. Durney, Reno, for Respondent.
Bradley Drendel & Jeanney and Bill Bradley, Reno, for Amicus Curiae Nevada Justice Association.
Lewis & Roca, LLP, and Daniel F. Polsenberg and Jennifer B. Anderson, Las Vegas, for Amicus
Curiae Nevada Hospital Association.
Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC, and D. Lee Roberts, Jr., and Rosemary Missisian,
Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Catholic Healthcare West.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, C.J.:
In this appeal, we consider whether hospitals owe an absolute nondelegable duty to provide
competent medical care to their emergency room patients through independent contractor doctors.
Although the parties settled in this matter, appellant Renown Health, Inc., reserved its right to appeal
the district court’s interlocutory order granting partial summary judgment based on the imposition of
a nondelegable duty. A portion of the settlement remains contingent upon this appeal. We conclude
that no such absolute duty exists under Nevada law, nor are we at this time willing to judicially
create one. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment insomuch
as the district court concluded that hospitals have such a nondelegable duty. We hold that Renown
may be liable for patient injuries under the ostensible agency doctrine that we previously recognized
in Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hospital of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 42, 910 P.2d 271 (1996).[1]
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal arises from the tragic illness of respondent Betty Vanderford’s minor son
Christopher Wall. After he complained of headaches, nausea, and fever, Vanderford took
Christopher to Renown’s emergency room on four different occasions. During the first visit, tests
were performed and Christopher was discharged and referred to a specialist. On the second visit, he
was given a prescription for an antibiotic and again discharged. On the third visit, Christopher was
given a prescription for Vicodin and encouraged to continue taking his antibiotic. Different doctors
attended to him on each of these visits.
Vanderford took Christopher to Renown’s emergency room for a fourth time after she found
him unconscious in the bathroom. At that time, he was diagnosed with basilar meningitis and
complications including abscesses. As a result of his illness, Christopher suffered permanent,
debilitating injuries, including brain damage.
Vanderford sued Renown in her individual capacity and on behalf of Christopher. The
district court granted partial summary judgment for Vanderford, finding that Renown owed
Christopher an absolute nondelegable duty such that it was liable for the acts of the emergency room
doctors, who were independent contractors.
The district court provided four bases to support its conclusion that hospitals owe an absolute
nondelegable duty to their emergency room patients. The district court relied on Nevada statutes, the
Joint Committee on the Accreditation of Health Organizations (JCAHO) standards, with which
Renown complied, public policy, and common law principles found in sections 428 and 429 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and cases from Alaska and South Carolina to impose an absolute
nondelegable duty as a matter of law. The district court distinguished Oehler v. Humana, Inc., 105
Nev. 348, 775 P.2d 1271 (1989), and Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hospital of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 42, 910
P.2d 271 (1996), stating that neither case involved an emergency room patient and an independent
contractor doctor. Vanderford and Renown agreed on a settlement, resolving all issues except the
duty issue, on which Renown reserved its right to appeal.
DISCUSSION

Renown argues that the district court erred by concluding that it had an absolute nondelegable
duty to provide competent medical care to its emergency room patients through its independent
contractor doctors because no basis for imposing such a duty exists under Nevada law. Renown
therefore argues that the district court erred by granting partial summary judgment in this case. We
agree. We also discuss the ostensible agency doctrine as applied to emergency room scenarios like
the one in this case.
Standard of review
We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment and its conclusions
regarding questions of law de novo, without deference to the findings of the lower court. Wood v.
Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005); Pressler v. City of Reno, 118 Nev.
506, 509, 50 P.3d 1096, 1098 (2002).
The district court erred in imposing an absolute nondelegable duty on Renown
The district court based its decision to impose an absolute nondelegable duty on Renown on
Nevada’s statutory scheme, the JCAHO standards, public policy, and the common law. However,
we conclude that the district court erred in this determination because there is no basis in Nevada law
for imposing such a duty.
Generally, hospitals are not vicariously liable for the acts of independent contractor doctors.
Oehler v. Humana, Inc., 105 Nev. 348, 351, 775 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1989); see Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 409 (1965). The imposition of an absolute nondelegable duty is an exception to this
general rule. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1965). An absolute nondelegable duty is
essentially a strict liability concept, where, despite delegation of a duty to an independent contractor,
the principal remains primarily responsible for improper performance. See Black’s Law Dictionary
544 (8th ed. 2004). While we have recognized some exceptions to the general rule that hospitals are
not vicariously liable for the acts of independent contractor doctors, see, e.g., Schlotfeldt v. Charter
Hosp. of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 42, 910 P.2d 271 (1996), there is no legal or policy basis for imposing
an absolute nondelegable duty on Renown, and we decline to adopt one for the reasons set forth
below.
First, Nevada’s statutory scheme regulating hospital emergency room care does not provide a
basis for imposing an absolute nondelegable duty on hospitals. See NRS Chapter 439B. The
provisions create a scheme under which a hospital is a policy-setter and overseer, and the provisions
contemplate the delegation of medical care to qualified professionals. See, e.g., NRS 439B.410.
Similarly, the Nevada Administrative Code highlights a hospital’s administrative and supervisory
role, requiring that hospitals set procedure and ensure that policies and provisions conform to
national standards. See, e.g., NAC 449.331, 449.349, 449.3622.
Second, the JCAHO standards, with which Renown complied, do not require an absolute
nondelegable duty. Instead, these requirements again emphasize a hospital’s role as a policy-setter
and administrator. JCAHO, Accreditations Manual for Hospitals, Emergency Services, Standards IV.
Third, we decline to impose an absolute nondelegable duty on hospitals based upon public
policy. This court may refuse to decide an issue if it involves policy questions better left to the

Legislature. Nevada Hwy. Patrol v. State, Dep’t Mtr. Veh., 107 Nev. 547, 550-51, 815 P.2d 608,
610-11 (1991); see also Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420, 428 (Wash. 1997) (noting
that the policy decision to expand the scope of an employer’s liability for an employee’s intentional
acts against a person to whom the employer owes a duty of care “should be left to the legislature”).
The Legislature has heavily regulated hospitals and would have codified a nondelegable duty to
emergency room patients if the Legislature had intended such a duty to be imposed on hospitals.
Finally, the common law relied upon by the district court and Vanderford does not support
the imposition of an absolute nondelegable duty. In Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987),
the Alaska Supreme Court imposed a nondelegable duty on hospitals, holding them vicariously liable
for a doctor’s negligence when a patient visits the emergency room and the hospital assigns a doctor
to the patient. Id. at 1385. But subsequently, the Alaska Legislature modified this holding, passing
a law that allows hospitals to rebut the nondelegable duty by proving it was unreasonable for the
patient to assume that the hospital provided care because the patient had notice of the doctor’s
independent contractor status. Alaska Stat. § 09.65.096 (2008).[2] Further, in Fletcher v. South
Peninsula Hospital, the Alaska Supreme Court refused to extend the nondelegable duty to operating
rooms. 71 P.3d 833, 839 (Alaska 2003).
Here, the district court also relied on caselaw from South Carolina. In Simmons v. Tuomey
Regional Medical Center (Simmons I), 498 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), a case involving
hospitals’ duties in the emergency room setting, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed a
district court grant of summary judgment for a hospital, deciding that public reliance and regulations
imposed on hospitals “created an absolute duty for hospitals to provide competent medical care in
their emergency rooms.” Id. at 411. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court modified the
absolute nondelegable duty adopted by the court in Simmons I. Simmons v. Tuomey Regional
Medical Center (Simmons II), 533 S.E.2d 312, 322 (S.C. 2000). The Simmons II court concluded
that most jurisdictions hold hospitals liable for the acts of independent contractor doctors under
various theories, and this result remains the same, “whether it is through a theory of apparent agency
or nondelegable duty.” Id. at 320. The modified approach of Simmons II, called a nonabsolute
nondelegable duty, expressly adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 429, which is also
“sometimes described as ostensible agency.” Simmons II, 533 S.E.2d at 322. Under section 429, the
injured patient must show that the hospital held itself out to the public by providing services, that the
patient looked to the hospital and not an individual doctor for care, and that a patient in similar
circumstances would reasonably have believed that the physician was a hospital employee. Id.
When the patient can demonstrate genuine issues of material fact exist as to these factors, “summary
judgment is not appropriate.” Id. at 323.
In examining the caselaw cited by the district court and by Vanderford to support an absolute
nondelegable duty, we conclude that these cases, while labeling their approaches as a nondelegable
duty, actually require the same analysis as our ostensible agency approach in Schlotfeldt v. Charter
Hospital of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 42, 910 P.2d 271 (1996). Once a “nondelegable” duty becomes
nonabsolute, as described in Simmons II, the duty is no longer truly nondelegable. See Simmons II,
533 S.E. 2d at 322. As noted above, a nondelegable duty is a strict liability concept. Thus, a
“nondelegable” duty that is not absolute veers away from the concept of strict liability, and creates a
duty that is not actually nondelegable. A nonabsolute nondelegable duty is much closer to the
ostensible agency approach and is not truly a nondelegable duty at all. Based on the above, we

conclude that the district court erred by imposing an absolute nondelegable duty on Renown.
However, we still must address the ostensible agency doctrine as a basis for holding hospitals liable
for the acts of their independent contractor emergency room doctors.
Hospitals may be liable for the acts of their independent contractor doctors under the ostensible
agency doctrine adopted in Schlotfeldt
Given our prior holding in Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hospital of Las Vegas, where we adopted
the ostensible agency doctrine, we conclude that Renown could be held liable under that theory. 112
Nev. 42, 48, 910 P.2d 271, 275 (1996).
In Schlotfeldt, we considered the acts of an independent contractor doctor who attended to a
patient at a drug and alcohol treatment center. Id. at 43-44, 910 P.2d at 272. The independent
contractor doctor attended to Schlotfeldt at the request of a Charter Hospital psychiatrist who was
busy with other patients. Id. Charter did not release Schlotfeldt, despite her requests to return home,
because, based on the independent contractor doctor’s conclusions, she was a suicide risk and
releasing her would be imprudent. Id. at 44, 910 P.2d at 272. The patient sued the treatment center
for false imprisonment, and the district court instructed the jury that the treatment center was
vicariously liable for the doctor’s acts because the treatment center chose the doctor to examine
Schlotfeldt. Id. at 46-47, 910 P.2d 274. Charter opposed such an instruction because the existence
of an agency relationship between Charter and the doctor was a question of fact for the jury. Id. at
48, 910 P.2d at 275.
We agreed with Charter. Id. at 49, 910 P.2d at 275. Consequently, we adopted an approach
known as ostensible agency, which applies when a patient goes to the hospital and the hospital
selects the doctor to treat the patient, such that it is reasonable for the patient to assume the doctor is
an agent of the hospital. Id. at 48, 910 P.2d at 275. We identified typical fact questions that arise
under ostensible agency, including: (1) whether the patient entrusted herself to the hospital, (2)
whether the hospital selected the doctor, (3) whether the patient reasonably believed the doctor was
an agent of the hospital, and (4) whether the patient had notice of the doctor’s independent contractor
status. Id. at 49, 910 P.2d at 275. Whether a patient can demonstrate these factors remains a
question for the jury. Id. at 48-49, 910 P.2d at 275.
Here, we see no compelling reason why Schlotfeldt should not apply to substantially similar
factual scenarios that involve independent contractor emergency room doctors. Like the patient in
Schlotfeldt, Vanderford and Christopher entrusted themselves to Renown by going to its emergency
room. They did not choose a doctor for Christopher, but were subject to the choice by Renown, as is
the case in most emergency room scenarios. The remaining two questions, focusing on Vanderford’s
reasonable beliefs and whether Vanderford had notice, are subject to the jury’s fact-finding but
present a situation quite similar to the treatment center discussed in Schlotfeldt. Public policy
supports this decision as well because under an ostensible agency approach, hospitals may be liable
for the malpractice of independent contractor emergency room physicians. This theory allows tort
victims recovery by demonstrating facts that are often present in an emergency room setting, while
not judicially creating an absolute duty on hospitals that is better left to the Legislature to impose.
Moreover, the typical questions of fact discussed in Schlotfeldt that make up the ostensible
agency inquiry are similar to section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the nonabsolute

nondelegable duty adopted in Simmons II. See Schlotfeldt, 112 Nev. at 49, 910 P.2d at 275. The
Simmons II approach presents an approach no different than the ostensible agency doctrine we
articulated in Schlotfeldt. Whether it is called a nonabsolute nondelegable duty or ostensible agency,
the result remains the same: hospitals may be held liable for the acts of independent contractor
emergency room doctors if the hospital selects the doctor and it is reasonable for the patient to
assume that the doctor is an agent of the hospital.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that hospitals do not have an absolute nondelegable
duty to provide nonnegligent medical care to emergency room patients through doctors who are
independent contractors. However, we extend the ostensible agency doctrine of Schlotfeldt to
emergency room scenarios. We therefore conclude that Renown may be held liable for the acts of its
independent contractor emergency room doctors under this approach. Because the district court
improperly imposed an absolute nondelegable duty on Renown, we reverse the decision of the
district court insomuch as it imposed upon Renown a nondelegable duty to provide competent
medical care to its emergency room patients through independent contractor doctors.

HARDESTY, DOUGLAS, and PICKERING, JJ., concur.

**********FOOTNOTES**********
[1]
We do not address whether this case supports a finding of ostensible agency because it
involves unresolved questions of fact.
[2]
This legislative modification of the Jackson holding was recognized in Evans ex rel. Kutch v.
State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1067 (Alaska 2002).
*****************************
CHERRY, J., with whom SAITTA and GIBBONS, JJ., agree, dissenting:
I agree with the majority that Nevada law does not currently support the imposition of an
absolute nondelegable duty upon hospitals to render competent services to its emergency room
patients. I also agree that the ostensible agency doctrine, previously discussed by this court in
Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hospital of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 42, 910 P.2d 271 (1996), provides a natural
extension to the emergency room scenario contemplated here. However, given the public policy
considerations, I would adopt the nonabsolute nondelegable duty approach, as the Supreme Court of
South Carolina decided in Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center (Simmons II), 533 S.E.2d
312 (S.C. 2000).
Emergency room patients may base their decisions regarding care largely upon hospital
advertising and the reputation of the hospital as an entity. These patients do not seek out individual
doctors, but expect the hospital to provide competent emergency room care. Hospitals should not be
able to escape liability for the malpractice of independent contractor emergency room doctors when

hospitals hold themselves out to the public in this manner. The Simmons II approach accounts for
this commercialization of medicine and the “public perception of the unity of a hospital and its
emergency room.” Id. at 322.
Further, some emergency room patients may be required to seek treatment at specific hospital
emergency rooms due to contracts with their insurance carriers. In creating a contractual relationship
with insurance companies, hospitals limit patient choice and assure themselves a certain portion of
emergency room business.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

